'Father of the Iranian Bomb' | 17 Years After Israel Destroyed Syria's Reactor, Netanyahu Is Blamed for Iran's Nuclear Advances

Despite the cozy relations, Iran's leaders were kept in the dark by Syrian President Bashar Assad. It's still not clear what was the Syrian-North Korean quid pro quo. For example, was the reactor meant to serve Syria or provide backup for North Korea's nuclear arsenal? Or operate for both countries?

A. admits that he and his team were preoccupied with Iran's nuclear efforts, so they were much less concerned about the small nuclear programs of Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Libya and even Egypt. Syria's program wasn't even on Israeli intelligence's radar.

"Anybody who tells you that he knew that Syria was building a nuclear reactor either didn't know or is a liar," says Ram Ben Barak, the head of one of the Mossad's operational wings at the time, later deputy head of the agency and now a member of opposition leader Yair Lapid's Yesh Atid party.

But at a certain point, the Israeli intelligence community – the Mossad and Military Intelligence – began to receive information indicating that something very secretive was simmering.

The Mossad focused on Ibrahim Othman, the head of Syria's nuclear commission. Ben Barak's surveillance team followed the Syrian to his meetings in Europe and especially to the International Atomic Energy Agency's meetings in Vienna. But Othman was extremely cautious and the Mossad found no incriminating evidence.

Short on human resources, then-Mossad chief Meir Dagan was disappointed and decided not to waste his operatives on hopeless missions. "Give me one more chance," Ben Barak begged Dagan, who reluctantly agreed. Ben Barak hit the bull's-eye.

His surveillance people contacted Othman in Vienna, and, using one deception or another, diverted his attention and got their hands on his digital gear. It proved to be a gold mine.

The content mined from his device was sent to Military Intelligence's laboratories. But amazingly – another example of the failure to believe that Syria was conjuring a Middle East game changer – the materials were considered low priority, waiting in line to be processed. A few weeks later, though, Israeli intelligence officials were in shock.

Dagan quickly showed the photos to Olmert, who understood and immediately decided not to allow one of Israel's bitterest enemies to have nuclear weapons. He shared the information with his friend, U.S. President George W. Bush. Olmert asked him one question: Will you act?

Bush explained that the United States was already mired in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and couldn't afford to open a third front. In a show of courageous leadership, Olmert decided that Israel would act alone. He instructed the Mossad and Military Intelligence to continue with their intelligence gathering; they sent special-operations units into Syria to take samples and monitor the nuclear activities there.

Israel considered two options; one was a ground attack against the nuclear reactor. Three years earlier, as has been reported, the CIA and the Mossad devised a joint ground operation to sabotage Iran's power grid, which led to its nuclear sites.

In the preparations for the strike, Olmert made another crucial decision. He decided that Israel would not claim responsibility and ordered everyone privy to the secret to maintain complete silence. He didn't want to embarrass Assad and provoke him to retaliate.

But one Israeli broke the silence. In a typical show of narcissism and self-promotion, then-opposition leader Netanyahu violated the censorship instructions and boasted that he had known about the strike.

Luckily enough, Assad ignored Netanyahu's blabbing. In retrospect, based on a psychological profile of Assad drawn up by psychologists in Israeli intelligence, Olmert, Mossad chief Dagan and the military chief at the time, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, proved right. They believed that if Israel didn't declare responsibility for the attack, Assad would swallow his pride and not react.

It turned out that Assad shared his ambitious desire to go nuclear with an exceedingly small group of advisers. Even Syria's military chief wasn't privy to the secret. One of Assad's advisers who did know was Brig. Gen. Mohammed Suleiman, the executor of the nuclear project.

Six months after the airstrike, he was assassinated by Israel Navy snipers while dining at his villa in the coastal city of Latakia. Assad stood by his contradictory and apologetic explanations that, back in September, the target destroyed was an agricultural site, not a nuclear reactor.

Olmert was an excellent prime minister, but he was stained by his earlier corrupt behavior as mayor of Jerusalem, which eventually forced him to resign and sent him to prison for a year and a half.

Yet together with Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who ordered the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, Olmert will go down in history as the Israeli leader who prevented hostile Arab nations from posing an existential threat to the Jewish state.

Netanyahu, on the other hand, will be remembered as a failed leader responsible for Hamas' attack from Gaza and Iran's presence on the nuclear threshold.

In 2018, Netanyahu and his Mossad chief at the time, Yossi Cohen, encouraged then-President Donald Trump to take the United States out of the 2015 nuclear deal signed by Iran and six world powers.

"No doubt, Netanyahu put Iran's nuclear threat on the table for a couple of years," A. says. "His campaign was effective until 2015. But then, once the deal was negotiated and eventually signed, he missed a historic opportunity."

As A. puts it, "True, the nuclear deal is far from ideal, but he could have influenced the negotiations by presenting an alternative and demanding that Israel would be militarily and diplomatically compensated. Instead, Netanyahu opposed the deal, saying that no deal is better than a bad deal."

Thus, Israel was isolated on the nuclear issue. According to A., Iran's nuclear sites are dispersed all over the country, and some are very well protected underground. "Israel can't act alone," he says. "Only an international coalition led by the United States applying diplomatic, economic and military pressure can prevent Iran from having nuclear bombs."

What makes A. even angrier is Netanyahu's statement a few days ago that "I am here to prevent nuclear bombs from being dropped on our heads."

For A. and many of his colleagues in the security establishment, Netanyahu's words are hollow slogans. By prioritizing his personal and political survival over the country's interests – combined with refusing to listen to his security chiefs and isolating himself from Washington and the wider international community – Netanyahu brought upon Israel the calamity of October 7 and a nuclear Iran.

A. concludes that Iran is on its way to having nuclear bombs and "no one will stop it."

"Equipped with nuclear bombs, Iran will pose a real danger to Israel's very existence," he says, adding that this development "might endanger Israel's security for decades to come, long after Hamas is defeated."

If this happens, A. says, Netanyahu can shamefully be labeled "the father of the Iranian bomb."