'It's a War of Cruel Rich People. Israel's Form of Combat in Gaza Is Unusually Wasteful'

According to another prominent figure in Israel's military industries, who has conducted business with the army for years, bombs that were not American-made were responsible for many failures. "It's not just a matter of old merchandise. When you roam the world looking for ammunition from all and sundry, the manufacturers give you anything they have stockpiled, and sometimes you lose."
The same account of scrounging around for ammunition was repeated by a number of sources in the industry, with whom TheMarker, Haaretz's business newspaper, spoke in the past few weeks. The interviewees also mentioned the fact that ordnance that had previously been disqualified for possible procurement because of its low quality, was purchased and put into use after October 7.

In the words of a source engaged in international ammunition trade, "It all begins with a worldwide shortage of raw materials in the industry. We're talking about items such as primers [chemicals that trigger the detonation process in bombs], fuses for ammunition and explosives, whether TNT or RDX. All the factories that manufacture these raw materials – in India, Japan, Eastern or Western Europe – are 'fully booked' at the moment. When you approach them, they say, 'Take a card and join the line.'

"What that means," the source continues, "is that even if a company like Elbit [an Israel-based, global military technology company] decides to manufacture 200,000 shells a year, the requisite raw materials won't be available. That's the situation worldwide in the wake of the war in Ukraine. At times, the Ukrainians fired 10,000 155 mm artillery shells each day."

Searching for armaments

In response to a query from TheMarker about how much ammunition has been used in the Gaza war to date, the IDF stated that it "does not provide details on the subject in question for reasons of field security and in order not to provide information to the enemy." In any event, the Israel Air Force has according to some sources dropped tens of thousands of bombs on the Strip, along with the hundreds of thousands of shells that have been fired into the enclave.

One 155 mm shell costs between $1,500 and $3,500; a 120 mm shell for Israel's Merkava tanks costs around $7,500; and a smart bomb used by the IAF goes for $21,000. The price tag for the effort to destroy Hamas in the Gaza Strip, in terms of ammunition alone, could approach $2 billion – and to that one has to add the cost of aviation fuel, the costly interceptions executed by the Iron Dome system in defense of the home front, or the overall expense of fielding the entire army.

In any case, the story of Israel's so-called ammunition economy begins in Ukraine. Already in early 2023, less than a year after the Russian invasion, the U.S. military had begun to empty out the warehouses of ammunition it stockpiles in Israel.

"The Americans built these emergency warehouses here with the understanding that it was good for them and good for us," says Yehoshua Kalisky, a senior researcher at the Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies. "But in the months before Swords of Iron [the official name of Israel's war in Gaza], they shipped 300,000 artillery shells to Europe from here. That was done in the knowledge and with the understanding that the minute Israel would be in need [of such ordnance], they would immediately replenish our stockpiles."

According to a senior figure in the Israeli weapons industry, "Before the war in Ukraine, there was a feeling around the world that standard issue ammunition was not such a critical issue. Many production lines around the world were cut back, above all in the United States, and in Israel as well. In Israel there were two main reasons for this. First, after the Yom Kippur War, the United States left emergency stockpiles here of plenty of ammunition, on which the IDF could rely. Israel did not see munitions as an urgent need.

"Second," the expert continues, "we always thought it would be possible to buy elsewhere, and said that [Israeli] technology would ultimately triumph. But the thing is that [local] production lines need not only machines, but also people. The workers on these production lines did not serve in [IDF's elite cyber unit] 8200. They are 'dirty' lines, it's not high-tech."

The result when the war broke out was that Israel was in need of a massive airlift of ammunition from the United States, which was indeed provided. "The airlift to replenish the stock wasn't a 'favor' the Americans did us – it was all anchored in the agreement between us," Kalisky explains. "But the 28,000 tons of equipment, ammunition, special vehicles and medical equipment that arrived here on 280 flights and via 40 to 60 huge ships, show how vital it was to restock. Especially because this is a bomb-saturated war."

It's not philanthropy

Aggravating the situation of depleted stores of ammunition that existed on October 7 is the fact that Israel is not handling the Gaza campaign economically. According to a former ranking IDF officer, "Our form of combat at the moment is unusually wasteful. You could term it 'a war of cruel rich people.' We're attacking innumerable targets, without asking whether it's worth attacking them, and artillery is being used in places where it's not really obligatory."

He adds: "The fact that we are demolishing everything before entering is being manifested in the duration of the operation. If you'd asked before the war how long it would take us to conquer Gaza, the answer would've been that we were talking about a situation that could be accomplished in far less than four months. In principle, it would be possible to arrive at similar achievements with 10 percent of the destruction we have caused. Our assumption is that if we had sown less destruction, we would have sustained more casualties. On the other hand, however, less destruction would have meant that we would be on the ground there for less time – and less time means fewer casualties.

"These questions – why we've been in Gaza for such a long time and are using such a large amount of ammunition – are major issues that do not come up for public discussion because 'it's bad for the morale of the troops.' But the amount of munitions that have been used in Gaza is unprecedented, and to critical eyes this is wasteful, protracted combat. We were battered heavily at the start [on October 7] and prefer to apply force powerfully and cruelly over taking risks."

This reckless conduct apparently reflects Israel's absolute assumption that the United States will continue to arm and finance it. Last month, the U.S. Senate approved an aid package of $14 billion for Israel, as part of a $95-billion foreign aid bill, though the House has yet to pass the legislation. Israel's 2024 budget is based on the premise that the money will arrive in the course of the year. However, there is concern in the Finance Ministry, voiced in internal discussions, that political instability in the United States in advance of the upcoming elections will delay the transfer of the funds.

Moreover, not all the money will be channeled to Israel even if the legislation is passed. About $6 billion has been earmarked for underwriting the post-October 7 deployment of the U.S. military in the Middle East. Israeli Treasury officials tried to argue that the cost of dispatching U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and other warships to the Mediterranean could not be considered direct aid – an approach that was not well received by their American interlocutors.

The Americans also specified the exact dispensation of the funding: $4 billion for Iron Dome interceptors; $1.2 billion for laser-based means of interception; and $3.5 billion to be invested in the same way as the regular annual security aid of $3.8 billion that Israel receives.

So at a time when Israeli's regular security budget is 63 billion shekels a year (currently $17.67 billion), half of which is expended on salaries and pensions, the amount Israel is slated to receive directly, in regular and special aid, is 45 billion shekels. In other words, the United States is largely bankrolling the Gaza war. This is not philanthropy. The money Israel receives flows to the American arms industry and enables it to thrive. Thus, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's public declarations – to the effect that Israel will not accept "international dictates" about postwar arrangements – are apparently incompatible with our economic reality.

Worrisome delays

The limitations of Israel's ammunition economy become even more acute in light of a possible heightened confrontation in Lebanon. Knowledgeable sources estimate that replenishing stockpiles to a level that would enable the IDF to act unimpeded on the northern front as well as in the south will take time, and that for deployment on all other fronts, even more time will be needed.

"In order to deal with Syria, the Houthis and Lebanon simultaneously," one source explains, "including the ability to respond wherever you want without limitations stemming from ammunition management, you need more than a few thousand bombs. You need a lot of interceptors and a lot of guided precision weapons. In the meantime, we're working in a piecemeal way: Here and there we attack special shipments of arms close to the border.

"You know, a media report about one bomb or 50 bombs that you dropped is the same," the source continues. "It's not that we can't launch a new campaign [on other fronts], but it's important to preserve our flexibility. In terms of aircraft and crews, we can work on two fronts and also three, but we need as much ammunition as possible to aim at the enemy. At that level [of conflict], even if we have basic stockpiles, we won't want to get the point where we are empty."

Israel is currently working intensively to bring its ammunition stores up to par. The production lines of IMI Systems (formerly Israel Military Industries) for shells, which had waned in recent years for business reasons, have been reinvigorated and are working at high intensity. Still, opening a new production lines is a process that takes more than a few months. The big arms manufacturers in the United States have tripled their activity, and industry figures are favorably surprised by the rate at which Israel's ammunition supplies are being replenished by local and foreign entities alike. But Israel is still insufficiently prepared for a multi-arena war, when it comes to the quantities of muitions at its disposal.

Israeli officials who deal with the American arms industries have their finger on the pulse of developments there. They worry about the impact of every militant statement by Netanyahu or his cabinet ministers criticizing the United States, and about every report of President Joe Biden taking a swipe at the prime minister. Every delay in the supply of munitions is a cause for concern. The insiders note that if and when the United States gets to the point where it tries to pressure Israel about its conduct in the war using the ammunition it supplies as leverage, it will be done at first under the radar.

According to a senior figure who is in close touch with the American side, "It won't happen like a guillotine. No one will say, 'We are stopping supplies to Israel.' It's a process that will begin very slowly. First a directive will be issued there to step up the checks on a particular product they are supposed to deliver to us. Then someone will discover that it's necessary to renew the export license for a part in some sort of ammunition system that we need – and it will be delayed. There are all sorts of methods. An atmosphere that's not pleasant to work in will arise. When we ask [representatives of] the American side whether they would like to meet up with us, they'll say 'In another two months,' or 'We're prohibited from traveling to Israel.' And when we send parts or systems for repair there, we'll be told, 'There are three clients ahead of you in line.'"

Taking these fears into account, Kalisky, of the INSS, has this insight to offer: "Our problem is not the price we pay for the ammunition, but its availability: World demand has reduced the availability. We have embarked on a period of regional wars: the campaign in Ukraine, our campaign, the campaign in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait against the Houthi threat, and the Taiwan-China confrontation.

"Still, the IDF knows how to make the calculations regarding its ammunition economy, and in my estimation the tensions in the north will decline, because neither we nor Hezbollah have an interest in a broad confrontation there. So, taking into account the U.S. airlift and the IDF's procurement plans, my assessment is that the issue of ammunition will not limit the IDF when an order is given. The munitions will arrive – but we still need to pay attention to those who hold the purse strings in this story."